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Preventing Creditor Abuse of Deficiency 
Judgments: Some Good (and Not-so-
Good) Approaches 
Dale A. Whitman* 
In his recent article, Tools of Ignorance: An Appraisal of 
Deficiency Judgments,1 Professor Alan Weinberger accurately 
identifies both the benefits and detriments of statutory “fair 
value” limitations on deficiency judgments. The principal benefit 
of these statutes, of course, is that they stand in the way of a 
windfall double recovery by mortgage creditors. In many cases 
there is little or no competitive bidding at foreclosure sales, 
leaving the way clear for the creditor to bid at a level far below 
the property’s market value and thus, gain both the full value of 
the property and the amount of a deficiency measured by the 
artificially low bid. This is simply an outrage, and the basic 
principles of fairness demand some means of preventing it. 
On the other hand, determining what fair value is—indeed, 
defining what we mean by fair value—is often left ambiguous by 
fair value statutes. Even if the meaning is clear, determining 
value by a war of expert appraisal witnesses is a messy, complex, 
expensive, and often inaccurate process. 
I find myself very much in sympathy with Weinberger’s 
suggestions for an appraisal process, built into the statute, that 
will, in most cases, produce a fair-value figure at the cost of only 
one or two appraisals, and without the added expense of in-court 
testimony. His references to the South Carolina and Louisiana 
procedures, and his proposed modifications of them, are very 
helpful. 
The Mortgages Restatement—of which Grant Nelson and I 
were co-reporters—takes an admittedly radical position on the 
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 1. Alan M. Weinberger, Tools of Ignorance: An Appraisal of Deficiency 
Judgments, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829 (2015), 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol72/iss2/8. 
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fair value issue.2 In essence, it invites courts to adopt a fair-value 
limitation on deficiency judgments, even if their legislatures have 
not done so by statute.3 One might criticize this as “judicial 
legislation.” But on the other hand, foreclosure in the Anglo-
American legal system has always been an equitable proceeding, 
and courts of equity surely have inherent power to fashion fair 
remedies. I would argue that the Restatement is simply inviting 
courts to make foreclosure more fair and just by imposing a fair-
value limitation on deficiencies. 
Several recent cases suggest that courts have not been quite 
as unwilling to act on their own to adopt the Restatement’s fair 
value approach, as Professor Weinberger suggests. Last year in 
Sostaric v. Marshall,4 the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted 
the Restatement approach with no support whatsoever from West 
Virginia statutes.5 Arizona already has a fair value statute, but a 
few months ago, the Arizona Supreme Court was faced with the 
need to decide whether it could be waived by language in the 
mortgage.6 The court concluded that it could not and cited the 
Restatement’s fair value section and its comments to support that 
conclusion.7 It thus strengthened the fair value concept in its 
practical operation in Arizona.  
Tennessee previously did not have fair value legislation, but 
in 2006, the Court of Appeals was invited to follow the 
                                                                                                     
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997). 
 3. See id. cmt. a (adopting “the position of the substantial number of 
states that, by legislation or judicial decision, afford the deficiency defendant the 
right to insist that the greater of the fair market value of the real estate or the 
foreclosure sale price be used in calculating the deficiency”). 
 4. 766 S.E.2d 396, 401 (W. Va. 2014). 
 5. See id. at 403 (“We conclude that the better and more legally sound 
approach is to follow section 8.4 of the Restatement . . . and allow a defendant to 
assert, as a defense in a deficiency judgment proceeding, that the fair market 
value of real property was not obtained at a trustee foreclosure sale.”). Notably, 
in Sostaric, there was a stirring dissent based on the “judicial legislation” 
argument. Id. at 409–10 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
 6. CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC, 341 P.3d 452, 453 (Ariz. 
2014).  
 7. See id. at 454 (“Consistent with these principles, we have sometimes 
observed that waivers of statutory rights may “impliedly” be prohibited. Our 
past decisions have also stated that parties may waive statutory rights granted 
solely for the benefit of individuals, but rights enacted for the benefit of the 
public may not be waived.” (internal citations omitted)).  
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Restatement and adopt that concept in Lost Mountain 
Development Co. v. King.8 The court quoted the Restatement at 
length and with apparent enthusiasm.9 It also quoted from, and 
appeared to readopt, a 1983 Tennessee Court of Appeals case, 
Duke v. Daniels.10 That decision permitted a borrower to 
challenge the amount of a deficiency judgment, but only if the 
borrower could show that the price paid at the sale was “grossly 
inadequate.”11 Without explaining exactly how or why, the court 
concluded that this was the same as the Restatement approach:12 
Whatever procedural rules or burdens of proof apply, under 
both analyses the issue in deficiency actions is the fair market 
value of the property at the time it was sold. Thus, the 
fundamental principle is that the deficiency judgment should 
reflect the difference in the fair market value, if it is greater 
than the sales price, and the amount still owed. We think this 
principle is well-grounded and promotes the goal of fairness.13 
This is a lovely summary of the Restatement principle, but it 
completely ignores Duke’s limitation of that principle to cases in 
which the sale price was “grossly inadequate.” 
The Tennessee court’s opinion in Lost Mountain, like the 
West Virginia court’s decision in Sostaric v. Marshall,14 
illustrates that a court can be influenced by the Restatement to 
impose limits on deficiency claims even when there is no statute 
directing it to do so. But Lost Mountain is fraught with 
uncertainty. Did the Tennessee court mean that even a small 
inadequacy in bid price would warrant the court’s reduction of 
the deficiency judgment by the same amount, or did it mean that 
only a large inadequacy—a “gross inadequacy” of price—would 
                                                                                                     
 8. No. M2004-02663-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3740791 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 
19, 2006). 
 9. See id. at *7–8 (quoting § 8.4 and comment (a) directly).  
 10. 660 S.W.2d 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). 
 11. Id. at 795.  
 12. The court conceded that there was one difference between the 
Restatement and Duke v. Daniels: the court in Duke used the sale price as the 
presumptive fair value, so that the borrower would have to overcome that 
presumption. The Restatement embodies no such presumption. 
 13. Lost Mountain Dev. Co., 2006 WL 3740791, at *8. 
 14. 766 S.E.2d 396, 401 (W. Va. 2014). 
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justify the court stepping in and limiting the deficiency? The 
court’s intent on this point is simply unclear. 
In 2010, the Tennessee General Assembly, perhaps prompted 
by the Lost Mountain case, finally adopted a fair value statute.15 
The statute states that, in the absence of fraud, collusion, 
misconduct, or irregularity in the sale process, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the sale price is the fair value.16 The 
borrower can seek to overcome the presumption, however, by 
providing evidence “that the property sold for an amount 
materially less than the fair market value of property at the time 
of the foreclosure sale.”17 This language replaces the gross 
inadequacy standard of Duke—if indeed that was still the 
standard after Lost Mountain—with a “materially less” standard, 
but it does little to remove the uncertainty. How much is 
materially less? The term is just as vague as gross inadequacy, 
although it sounds somewhat more favorable to borrowers. 
Since the statute’s adoption, five Tennessee Court of Appeals 
cases have grappled with that question. In these cases, the bids 
were the following percentages of the highest available appraisal 
value: 85.7%,18 89%,19 78.1%,20 84.2%,21 and 80%.22 In each case, 
the Court of Appeals found that the bid at the sale was not 
sufficiently below the property’s value to be materially less. It is 
still uncertain how much greater the gap must be in order to 
meet the statute’s standard. 
Surely this is a poor way to spend judicial resources. The 
Tennessee General Assembly presumably intended the materially 
less standard to address the fact that when seeking a deficiency, 
lenders will have—as yet undetermined—costs in marketing and 
                                                                                                     
 15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-5-118 (West 2010). 
 16. Id. § 35-5-118(b).  
 17. Id. § 35-5-118(c). 
 18. State of Franklin Bank v. Riggs, No. E2010–01505–COA–R3–CV, 2011 
WL 5090888, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011). 
 19. GreenBank v. Sterling Ventures, L.L.C., No. M2012-01312-COA-R3-
CV, 2012 WL 6115015, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2012). 
 20. FirstBank v. Horizon Capital Partners, LLC, No. E2013-00686-COA-
R3-CV, 2014 WL 407908, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014). 
 21. Capital Bank v. Brock, No. E2013-01140-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 
2993844, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2014). 
 22. Halliman v. Heritage Bank, No. M2014-00244-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 
1955448, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015). 
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carrying the property until it can be resold, and therefore are 
entitled in fairness to bid somewhat less than fair value to cover 
these costs. But the materially less test is an awkward and 
inefficient method of addressing this issue. As I will suggest in 
more detail below, it would have been far preferable for the 
General Assembly to simply fix a percentage of appraised value 
below which the bid would result in reduction of the deficiency 
judgment. Instead, the legislature “punted” the question back to 
the courts, which—despite having written five fairly detailed 
opinions on the subject—have yet to tell us the numerical answer. 
Moreover, even a fixed percentage would not address all of 
the issues. Appraisals are notoriously contingent and 
approximate. For example, in one of the recent Tennessee cases, 
FirstBank v. Horizon Capital Partners, LLC,23 the borrowers had 
entered into a lease-purchase agreement on one of the foreclosed 
parcels.24 But the purchase option in the agreement was still 
unexercised at the time of the foreclosure and would not even 
vest in the prospective purchaser for another seven months.25 
One appraiser produced a valuation which was, by its terms, 
expressly dependent on the exercise of the option.26 
Such variations reemphasize Professor Weinberger’s point: 
the fair value concept is subtle and complex and cannot readily be 
encapsulated in a mere catch phrase. In defense of the 
Restatement, I would argue that it could hardly do more than 
that, for it is, after all, not a statute. A court that earnestly 
decides to adopt the Restatement would need to do a great deal of 
thinking about how to implement it, and I readily admit that the 
Restatement itself provides little guidance on this point. Indeed, 
that is the value of Professor Weinberger’s article. 
There is one issue on which I believe Weinberger’s proposal 
requires amendment. His draft statute is based on “appraised 
value,” which presumably means the current fair market value of 
the property. But if the lender is to be made whole, it is necessary 
                                                                                                     
 23. No. E2013-00686-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 407908 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 
2014). 
 24. Id. at *1.  
 25. Id. at *3. 
 26. Id. at *1.  
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to consider the lender’s probable carrying costs and marketing 
costs as well. The marketing costs can perhaps be estimated with 
some reasonable accuracy; they consist of a brokerage 
commission and a variety of miscellaneous expenses for title 
work, perhaps some survey and engineering reports, and other 
minor expenses of sale. Carrying costs are another matter; such 
items as insurance, property taxes, and the expense of securing 
the property will depend almost entirely on how long it is held, 
and at the time the deficiency judgment is awarded, the holding 
period may be anyone’s guess. Yet, these are real expenses and 
will simply come out the lender’s pocket if the lender is forced to 
give credit against the deficiency for the full appraised value of 
the property. 
One approach to this problem is to provide for an arbitrary 
percentage as a proxy for the total carrying and marketing costs 
by statute. The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act—adopted by 
the Uniform Laws Commission in 2002 but not adopted by any 
jurisdiction—takes this approach.27 Section 608 of the Act 
incorporates a fair value rule, but it employs ninety percent of the 
current fair market value—rather than the full value—as the 
base line from which the deficiency is computed.28 In effect, it 
assumes that the lender’s carrying and marketing costs will be 
ten percent of the appraised value. Obviously this is merely an 
approximation, and in many cases it will be somewhat 
inaccurate. But 90% is almost certainly closer to the lender’s 
actual liquidation value of the collateral than 100%, and the 10% 
discount is easy to calculate and apply. In light of the fact that 
the actual costs will usually lie mainly in the future and cannot 
be accurately itemized at the time the deficiency judgment is 
rendered, this is a sensible and practical approach. It is far 
simpler and less wasteful of lawyers’ and courts’ time than the 
materially less standard adopted by the Tennessee General 
Assembly and described above.29 
                                                                                                     
 27. UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 28. See id. § 608 (“If the court . . . finds that the foreclosure amount was 
less than 90 percent of the fair market value of the collateral, the court shall 
substitute 90 percent of the fair market value of the collateral for the foreclosure 
amount for the purpose of determining the deficiency . . . .”). 
 29. Supra notes 15–16. 
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Overall, Professor Weinberger has provided a valuable 
service by highlighting the inadequacies of the present fair value 
statutes and proposing a rigorous, practical, and relatively 
inexpensive method for establishing fair value. 
